TARGET MOTAD FOR RISK LOVERS by McCamley, Francis P. & Rudel, Richard K.







Present at Western Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting 
July 11-14, 1999
Fargo, ND*A paper submitted to the Selected Papers Committee for the 1999 meeting of the
Western Agricultural Economics Association.
**The authors are associate professors of Agricultural Economics at the University of
Missouri-Columbia.Abstract
of
Target MOTAD for Risk Lovers
Although risk analyses of discrete alternatives often identify at least one efficient
set for persons who prefer risk, preference for risk is usually ignored when the
decision variables are continuous.  This paper presents a version of Target MOTAD
which can be used when there is preference for risk.Target MOTAD for Risk Lovers
Agricultural economists use various techniques to evaluate risky alternatives.
When the decision variables are continuous, risk neutrality or risk aversion is almost
always assumed and mathematical programming is used to find optimal solutions.  By
contrast, when the number of choices is small, the assumptions about risk preferences
are sometimes less restrictive and stochastic dominance criteria are often applied.  It
is fairly common to identify efficient sets for decision makers who prefer risk as well
as for decision makers who are risk averse and/or approximately risk neutral.  The
recent study by Larson and Mapp is one of several for which this was done.
Friedman and others have suggested that risk seeking behavior should be rare
(or limited) in financial or production decision making because it is possible to buy
risk at very low prices through gambling.  This view is partly supported by empirical
studies of risk attitudes.  These studies usually find that more decision makers are risk
averse than risk loving.  Nonetheless, many of them also find that some persons are
risk seekers (Tauer; Love and Robison; King and Oamek).
It is appropriate to give more attention to risk aversion than to risk seeking.
However, it does not seem reasonable to consider both risk aversion and preference
for risk when a few discrete alternatives are feasible but to almost completely ignore
preference for risk when the decision variables are continuous.  This paper suggests
that it is often possible to consider preference for risk even when decision variables are
continuous.  One way of doing that is to apply a more general version of the Target
MOTAD model.
Two Simple Examples
We begin by considering two simple examples which illustrate some, but not
all, aspects of the problem of finding Target MOTAD solutions for decision makers2
who prefer risk.  For the first example, there are two equally likely states of nature and
two enterprises.  Let x1 and x2 be (nonnegative) activity levels for the enterprises.  The
net return received if the first state of nature occurs is 
(1)  y1 = 100x1 + 40x2.
If the second state of nature occurs, a net return of
(2)  y2 = 80x1 + 120x2
is received.  Assume that the sum of x1 plus x2 can be no greater than one.  These
assumptions imply that the set of feasible combinations of y1 and y2 is the triangle 0AE
in figure 1.  Table 1 presents the coordinates of the points labeled in figure 1.
Tauer's Target MOTAD model is consistent with the assumption of positive
marginal utility of net return.  This assumption seems reasonable for risk lovers as
well.  It means that only net return combinations associated with the line AE need to
be considered.3
TABLE 1.  Selected Feasible
Solutions for Simple Example
Label x1 x2 y1 y2
---$1000's--
0 0 0 0 0
A 0 1.00 40 120
B .35 .65 61 106
C .50 .50 70 100
D .90 .10 94 84
E 1.00 0 100 80
The traditional Target MOTAD model maximizes expected net return subject
to an upper limit on (the absolute value of) expected negative deviations (from the
Target level).  This can be illustrated by assuming a target of 98 and an upper limit
of 7 on expected deviations.  The optimal solution is D.
It is tempting to adopt an analogous approach for risk preferrers.  We might
maximize expected returns subject to either a lower limit on  expected negative
deviations or a lower limit on expected positive deviations from the target level.
Suppose the target level is 98 and we require expected negative deviations to be at
least 18.5.  B maximizes expected net return subject to the expected deviations
constraint.
Although indirect utility maximization of this sort works well when risk aversion
is assumed, there are at least two problems with it when preference for risk is
assumed.  The first problem is that although linear programming can help find optimal
solutions, the approach itself is not a linear program.  This difficulty may be
unavoidable; it seems to "go with the territory" when preference for risk is assumed.4
The second problem is that solutions obtained in this way often do not
maximize expected utility for any member of the relevant class of utility functions.  B
may maximize expected utility for some utility function but it probably does not
maximize expected utility function for any utility function consistent with preference for
risk.  It certainly does not maximize expected utility for any utility function belonging
to the family of utility functions which is analogous to (and extension of) the family of
utility functions consistent with conventional Target MOTAD.  B is associated with a
local maximum of expected utility for the member of the family of utility functions
(3)  U(z) = z + "[min(0, T - z)]
for which " equals -1/3.  B shares that property many of its neighbors.  The "global"
(constrained) maximum of expected utility for this utility function is at E.  Indeed, for
our simple example, only the "corners", A or E, maximize expected utility for (3) when
" is smaller than or equal to zero.  
A second simple example demonstrates that "corners" are not always the only
optimal solutions.  The second example is similar to the first.  The difference is that
the coefficients of x1 are 70 and 100 rather than 100 and 80.  The feasible set is now
0AC.  B is now not only maximizes expected utility locally for the utility function (3)
when " equals -1/3.  It is also a location of the global maximum.  It shares that
property with all of AC.  Thus, non-corners can be optimal but only if all of the corners
associated with the line segment or surface are also optimal.  For values of " other
than -1/3, either A or C is the unique optimal y vector.  Note that y1 is smaller than
the target level and y2 is larger than the target level everywhere on AC.  This absence
of target "crossing" is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for all of an edge or
surface to be optimal.  
A More General Target MOTAD Model5
Consider a more general Target MOTAD model:
(4)  Maximize Epi{yi + "[min(0, yi - T)]}
subject to
(5)  Cx - y = 0
(6)  Ax # b
(7)  x $ 0
In this model, summation (in (4)) is over i, p is an s-element column vector of
probabilities associated with the various states of nature, y is s-element column vector
of net returns associated with the states of nature, " is a risk aversion parameter, min
is the minimum function, T is a target return level, C is an s by n matrix of returns
associated with the enterprises for the various states of nature, x is an n-element vector
of enterprise levels, A is an m by n matrix of resource or technical requirements, b is
an m-element column vector of resource or technical levels, n is the number of
enterprises, m is the number of resource or technical constraints and s is the number
of states of nature.  We assume that the set of feasible y vectors is bounded from
above.
For positive or zero values of ", the model is consistent with the traditional
Target MOTAD model in the sense that any optimal solution of the traditional model
is also an optimal solution to (4) through (7) for some value of ".  Likewise, any
optimal solution of (4) through (7) is also an optimal solution to the traditional model
for some value of 8.  Despite the fundamental equivalence of the two models, they
appear to be different.  For that and other reasons, the traditional Target MOTAD
model is likely to continue to be used to examine implications of risk aversion.
This paper is more concerned with negative " values.  Note that " must be
greater than -1 to ensure that marginal utility is greater than zero for each state of6
nature.  The reader will recognize that (4) through (7) generally cannot be restated
as a linear program when " is negative.  This fact complicates finding of optimal
solutions.
Solution Procedure
Horst and Tuy suggest an iterative approach similar in spirit to, but different
in detail from, approaches used to solve linear and concave programming problems
which could be used to find optimal solutions.  We prefer an approach which involves
two or three more or less distinct phases.
The first phase identifies extreme or corner y vectors and also determines which
extreme y vectors are "adjacent" to each extreme y vector.  A second, optional, phase
applies screening criteria.  The final phase determines which extreme y vector(s) is
(are) optimal for the selected combination(s) of " and T.  It also determines whether
non-corner solutions are also optimal.  These phases are briefly discussed here.  More
information about them and other details of this study are available from the authors.
One method of identifying the set of extreme or corner y vectors is a multistage
branching procedure.  Murty (pp. 159-160) outlines a procedure of this type.
Any criterion which will not eliminate an optimal extreme y vector but which
might eliminate one or more suboptimal extreme y vectors may be a suitable screening
criterion.  Three criteria which have these characteristics are vector efficiency, first
degree stochastic dominance and (a weak version) of second stochastic inverse
dominance (SSID).  SSID is described by Zara￿ (1987, 1989).  Pairwise application
of these criteria is usually less effective than applying them in a manner consistent with
convex set stochastic dominance.
Another Example
Hazell's data are sometimes used to illustrate risk analysis methods.  His data7
define a small problem which has several interesting features.  We assume that each
state of nature (year) is equally likely.  Thus, each element of p equals one-sixth.
There are eleven extreme y vectors for the Hazell example.  The screening step
eliminated all but four of them.  Enterprise mixtures associated with the "survivors" are
presented in table 2.  Adjacent extreme y vectors are also noted.
   TABLE 2.  Enterprise Mixtures Associated with Extreme y Vectors
















1 27.45 100.00 72.55 2,4
2 100.00 23.53 76.47 1,7
4 100.00 100.00 1,7
7 100.00 100.00 2,4
For any combination of " and T, the optimal solution can be determined by
simply computing the value of the objective function (in (4)) for each of the four
surviving extreme y vectors.  For example, extreme y vector/enterprise mixture 4 is
optimal if " equals -.8 and T equals $81,500.
Figure 2 is included to show how the optimal solution depends on " and T.
Point F is the ", T combination just mentioned.  The sets of ", T combinations for
which any given extreme y vector is optimal are delimited by the solid lines.  The
numbers in the body of figure 2 identify the optimal extreme y vector.  Only " values
smaller than or equal to -.6 are shown in the figure.  We found that only extreme y
vectors are optimal for negative " values.  I.e., there are no optimal edge or surface
solutions.
Extreme y vector 1 is optimal for all " values from -.6 to zero.  In fact, extreme8







































T but at that
boundary, " is larger than 1.5 for all values of T.  This is consistent with our
expectations.  We expected that the mixture which maximizes expected returns might
also be optimal for at least moderate preference for and moderate aversion to risk.9
Extreme y vector 2 is not optimal for risk neutrality but is optimal both for
some combinations of " and T associated with preference for risk and for some
combinations associated with risk aversion.  Although they use a different format than
we do, McCamley and Kliebenstein's figure 1 and table 1 confirm the latter.  Their line
segment GN is associated with all combinations of " and T for which " is between
(about) 1.74 and 2.48 and T is between $47,264.71 and $55,629.41.
Extreme y vectors 1 and 2 are unique in this respect.  They are the only y
vectors which are optimal for both some risk lovers and some risk averters.  It easy to
verify that (our) extreme y vectors 4 and 7 are not among the infinite number of y
vectors included in the "complete set of Target MOTAD solutions" for risk averters.
The implications of risk programming models for marginal resource values
(shadow prices) are sometimes of interest.  The shadow price of any resource is a
function of " and T.  Within any subregion delimited by dotted and solid lines in figure
2, the shadow price vector has the form
(8)  (V0 + "V")/(1 + "P(z < T)).
P(z < T) is the probability that net return is smaller than T and is equal to the sum
of the probabilities associated with the states of nature for which net return is smaller
than the target level.  V0 is like an intercept vector in a system of regression or other
linear equations in that it is not observed unless " can be zero.  Since " can be zero
for extreme y vector 1, each V0 vector for extreme y vector 1 is equal to the (usual)10







" and T values for
which extreme
vector 4 is optimal, the land component of (8) is (363.25 + 194.67")/(1 + 2"/3).
This expression is combined with analogous expressions for extreme y vectors
1, 2 and 7 to show how the shadow price of land varies with " for two target levels,
$81,500 and $91,275.  Note that in figure 3, the land shadow price function is the
same for both target levels when " is between -.96 and .88.  It should also be
apparent that there are discontinuities in the shadow price graphs at " values for which
the optimal solution shifts from one extreme y vector to another.  This is one of several
differences between optimal solutions of (4) through (7) when " is negative and when
it is positive.  Shadow prices are continuous functions of " when " is positive.
Although shadow prices are not generally not continuous functions of " (for a
given T), the total (implied) value of the resources may be.  For the target level,
$81,500, the total value of the resource is a continuous function of "; for the target
level, $91,275, it is not.11
Concluding Remarks
We chose to present the optimal primal solutions and the shadow prices as
functions of " and T in order to be consistent with our model.  Presenting them as
functions of 8 (the limit on expected negative deviations) would have made them
superficially more consistent with the approach used by McCamley and Kliebenstein
but also more difficult to interpret than figures 2 and 3.
Many assumptions are made in this paper.  Linearity of the constraints (6) is
especially critical because it allows a problem with continuous decision variables to
(almost) be reduced to a problem with only a finite number of discrete alternatives.
The linearity assumption is not always satisfied.  However, the tendency to use linear
constraints (or linear approximations of nonlinear constraints) for empirical work
makes the limitation of our linearity assumption more theoretical than practical.12
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